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Notes
DUE PROCESS REQUIREMENTS IN PAYMENT
AND TERMINATION OF UNEMPLOYMENT
CO'P/ENS\T- A TTIN RENE-EWTTS
State unemployment compensation programs are largely
funded by monies raised' and distributed2 by the federal govern-
ment. As a result it would be expected that the government would
adopt uniform standards governing the administration of such pro-
grams, especially in the area dealing with a claimant's procedural
due process rights. This, however, is not the case. While the
federal government has prescribed minimum standards3 with which
the states must comply in order to qualify for federal funds, it has
been deficient in defining what due process safeguards, if any,
should be afforded to an unemployment compensation claimant.
The few cases that have dealt with the issue of whether a
claimant has a right to a hearing before his unemployment benefits
are terminated have failed to yield a definitive statement on the
subject. In an attempt to elucidate what hearing procedure must
be furnished to an unemployment compensation claimant, this
note will examine some recent cases concerned with this problem
and discuss their possible effects.
The leading case in this area is California Department of Hu-
man Resources Development v. Java.4 The Court's opinion in Java
deals primarily with the issue of whether unemployment compen-
sation benefits may be withheld from a claimant when an em-
1. Unemployment compensation funds are raised pursuant to the
Federal Unemployment Tax Act. 26 U.S.C. §§ 3301 et seq. (Supp. 1973).
2. Funds raised by the Federal Unemployment Tax Act are distrib-
uted pursuant to the Social Security Act. 42 U.S.C. § 501 et seq. (1969).
3. 42 U.S.C. § 503 (1969).
4. 402 U.S. 121 (1971).
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ployer appeals a State's initial determination of eligibility5 in light
of the Social Security Act's requirement that benefits be paid
"when due."6 However, the Court's opinion does incidentally touch
upon a claimant's procedural due process rights. In Java the
claimant filed suit in federal district court and alleged that the
suspension of benefits pending an employer's appeal not only vio-
lated the Social Security Act,7 but, that it also violated the claim-
ant's constitutional right to due process of laws since such benefits
were suspended without a pretermination hearing. 9 The claimant
contended this procedure conflicted with the stated goals of unem-
ployment compensation: to reduce "personal hardship as well as
society-wide depression in times of increasing unemployment."' 0
The three-judge district court, finding the median period of
5. Id. at 122. The appellees filed a claim for benefits after their
employment was terminated and were ruled eligible after an interview.
They were paid benefits immediately, but the benfits were suspended
pursuant to CAL. UNEMP. INS. CODE § 1335 when the employer filed an
appeal to the Department's Review Board.
6. 42 U.S.C. § 503(a) (1) (1969) provides:
(a) The Secretary of Labor shall make no certification for pay-
ment [of federal funds] to any State unless he finds that the
law of such State... includes provisions for-
(1) Such methods of administration . . . as are found by the
Secretary of Labor to be reasonably calculated to insure
full payment of unemployment compensation when
due....
7. Id.
8. The plaintiff alleged, and the district court concurred that Gold-
berg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970) required hearings to satisfy constitu-
tional due process requirements in cases where a claimant's benefits were
terminated.
9. Java v. Cal. Dept. of Human Resources, 317 F. Supp. 875 (N.D.
Cal. 1970). For the purposes of this Note, a predetermination interview
or hearing is one held prior to the determination of a claimant's initial
eligibility. A redetermination interview or hearing is one held after a de-
termination of eligibility has been made. The redetermination interview
concerns the issue of original eligibility, e.g., the circumstances surrounding
the claimant's separation from his most recent employment. A pretermi-
nation interview is held where the claimant is receiving benefits, but has
disqualified himself during his claim series, for one reason or another, e.g.,
no longer available for work. A post-termination hearing is one held after
the Department has found a claimant ineligible for benefits. This is usu-
ally held by a referee and is the first step of the appellate process for
unemployment compensation. Post-termination hearings and appeals from
Department decisions are outside the scope of this Note.
Basically, Java involved initial determination hearings and appeals
from that determination, Torres v. N.Y. Dept. of Labor involved redetermi-
nation hearings, and Pregent v. N.H. Dept. of Empl. Security involved
termination hearings.
10. Id.
11. Convened under the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 2281 (1965) which
provides:
delay between the employer's appeal and the claimant's resumption
of benefits to be seven weeks,12 held this delay frustrated the in-
tentions of the state and federal unemployment compensation pro-
grams.'3 The court also found that the California program was in-
tended to "stave off extreme persaonal hardship ... in times of in-
creasing unemployment"'14 and that the congressional intent to
"help the jobless when they need it the most"'15 was reflected in the
"when due" provision of the Social Security Act. 16 In examining
the administrative processes, the court determined that benefits
were due the claimant at the time he was determined to be initially
eligible. As a result the court concluded that summarily with-
holding the benefits without a prior hearing constituted constitu-
tional and federal statutory violations.
On appeal,17 the defendant Department argued that benefits
were not "due" until the initial determination of benefits had
become final.'6 It also argued that the filing of an appeal cast suf-
ficient doubt on the validity of the initial determination to merit
withholding of the benefits until the final determination in order
to protect the interests of the State and employers.1 9 The Court
gave this contention little weight noting that ninety-five to ninety-
eight per cent of the ineligible claimants were "weeded out" at the
initial determination. 20  Mr. Chief Justice Burger, writing for a
unanimous Court, refused 2 1 to consider the constitutional due proc-
ess questions raised by the lower court's discussion of the Gold-
berg22 case. He stated it was unnecessary to reach that issue in
light of the Court's decision that the California law2 3 conflicted
with the Social Security Act's 24 requirement to pay unemployment
compensation benefits when due.
25
The principal question answered by Java concerns the time
at which unemployment compensation becomes payable. The court
An interlocutory or permanent injunction restraining the enforce-
ment, operation or execution of any State statute by restraining
the action of any officer of such State in the enforcement or ex-
ecution of such statute . . . shall not be granted by any district
court or judge thereof upon the ground of unconstitutionality of
such statute unless the application therefore is heard and deter-
mined by a district court of three judges....




16. See note 6 supra.
17. 402 U.S. 121 (1971).
18. The initial determination becomes final only if the appeal period,
which is usually ten days, expires without an appeal being taken.
19. 402 U.S. at 133.
20. Id.
21. Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970).
22. See note 8 supra.
23. CAL. UNEMP. INS. CODE § 1335 (West).
24. See note 6 supra.
25. 402 U.S. at 124.
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stated that benefits must be paid immediately upon an administra-
tive determination of the claimant's eligibility.2 6 It made this de-
termination for a number of reasons. First, the Court found that
the primary objective of Congress in enacting a federal unemploy-
ment insurance program "was to provide a substitute for wages
lost during a period of unemployment not the fault of the em-
ployee. '27 Therefore benefits are to be paid as close to the claim-
ant's next pay day after his separation from employment as adminis-
tratively possible2s Second, since ninty-five to ninety-eight per cent
of the inegligible claimants were found ineligible at the time of the
initial determination, 29 the Court discounted the Department's con-
tention that there was a sufficient cloud on the claimant's eligible
status to warrant a denial of benefits until the final appeal was de-
cided.30 Third, the Department itself made it a practice of paying
benefits promptly upon the initial determination of eligibility. These
benefits were paid until an employer's appeal was filed.3 1 Thus,
it was apparent that even the Department felt this was the logical
time to commence payment of benefits. Finally, the court noted
that the employer suffered no adverse effects if he ultimately pre-
vailed over the claimant since his reserve amount was not charged
and his experience rating32 was not affected.
3 3
The crucial issue of due process hearing requirements in com-
pensation hearings was not resolved in Java. The decision indi-
cates that the administrative determination must be the result of a
"hearing of which both parties have notice and are permitted to
present their respective positions. '3 4 However the Java Court did
little to clarify this requirement beyond stating merely the hearing
is to be "informal and does not contemplate taking evidence in the
traditional judicial sense."
3 5
Nor have subsequent decisions 6 contributed much in this re-
26. Id. at 133.
27. Id. at 130.
28. Id.
29. Id. at 133.
30. Id.
31. Id. at 128.
32. The "employer's experience rating" is directly proportional to the
amount of claims filed by his ex-employees during a given year. This
rating determines the percentage of his gross payroll which he will have
to pay as unemployment tax. Thus the greater number of claims that
are paid against the employer's account, the higher his tax rate.
33. 402 U.S. at 135.
34. Id. at 133.
35. Id. at 134.
36. Indiana Empl. Security Div. v. Burney, 409 U.S. 540, rehearing
denied, 410 U.S. 970 (1973); and Tores v. N.Y. Dept. of Labor, 333 F.
gard. The only decision remotely helpful is Torres v. New York
Department of Labor.3 7 In Torres, as an example of what it consid-
ered to be adequate standards, the Court cited with approval the
New York Department of Labor's hearing procedure which "prior
to the suspension of benefits involved an interview, at which
claimant had an opportunity to present information favorable to his
version of the facts or unfavorable to that of his employer, and to
answer charges.
'38
The Supreme Court's failure to reach the constitutional issues
advanced in Java has not precluded the federal district courts from
doing so. Pregent v. New Hampshire Department of Employment
Security9 deals extensively with a claimant's right to a pre-termi-
nation hearing. This decision effectively incorporates the due proc-
ess hearing requirements enumerated in Goldberg v. Kelly 40 into
the unemployment compensation field.
Goldberg involved welfare claimants who sued New York's
Commissioner of Social Services alleging termination of welfare
benefits without a prior hearing constituted a violation of th.e four-
teenth amendment's due process clause.4 1 The Court found that
such procedure constituted state action since it deprived a person
of a governmental entitlement without procedural due process.
42
It made no distinction between an entitlement and a property right,
noting that "the extent to which procedural due process must be
afforded the recipient is influenced by the extent to which he may
be 'condemned to suffer grievance loss' ... -43 The need for a hear-
ing prior to termination was found because termination of welfare
Supp. 341 (S.D.N.Y. 1971), on remand, aff'd without opinion, 405 U.S. 949
(1972) (three justices dissenting). See notes 37-38 and accompanying text
infra for a discussion of Torres. The issues presented in Burney concerned
the necessity of a pretermination hearing and the nature of such a hearing.
These issues have been posed to the Court as follows:
Must it be a full, adversary, evidentiary hearing, or an informal
hearing process by which all interested parties are informed of
issues and alleged factor uron which determination of ineligibility
would be made, and are allowed to present such information and
explanations as they see fit, but without the formal requisites of
trial type hearings? 41 U.S.L.W. 3043.
Unfortunately the Court refused to decide these issues, finding that
the claim had been mooted by a reversal of the Department's original de-
termination of ineligibility. 409 U.S. at 542. Mr. Justice Marshall dis-
sented noting that a pretermination hearing was never held, the ineligibil-
ity decision was made in the post-termination processes and thus the issue
of the necessity of a pretermination hearing was not mooted. Id.
37. Id.
38. 333 F. Supp. at 344. The district court on remand concluded this
procedure was "reasonably calculated to insure that benefits are paid when
due."
39. 361 F. Supp. 782 (D.N.H. 1973).
40. 397 U.S. 254 (1970).
41. Id. at 256.
42. Id. at 261.
43. Id. at 262-63 citing Joint Anti Fascist Refugee Comm. v. McGrath,
341 U.S. 123, 168 (1951).
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benefits affects the claimant's only means to live while he waits
its adjudication therefore he is forced to concentrate heavily on
his ways to exist. This has a decidedly adverse effect on the per-
sonal resources he can draw upon to seek redress from the welfare
bureaucracy. 44 Receipt of benefits until adjudication also promotes
the dignity and well-being of all persons living in the state.45
Another factor influencing the extent of procedural due
process is a balancing test whereby the recipients interest in
avoiding the law must outweigh the government's interest in sum-
mary adjudication.46 The Court found that the claimant's need for
uninterrupted benefits and the state's interest that benefits not be
erroneously terminated outweighed the state's interest in concern-
ing fiscal and administrative resources because the stakes are too
high for the claimant and "the possibility for honest error or irrit-
able misjudgment is too great," and because the state has the
ability to minimize the costs by scheduling prompt hearings and
skillful use of its resources. 4T There the Court held that the wel-
fare recipients are entitled to a prior due process hearing and enu-
merated the minimum due process requirements:
(a) Such hearing need not take the form of a judicial or
quasi-judicial trial, but the claimant must be provided
with timely and adequate notice detailing the reasons for
termination, and an effective opportunity to defend by
confronting and cross-examining adverse witnesses and by
presenting his own arguments and evidence orally before
the decision-maker.
(b) Counsel need not be furnished at the pretermination
hearing, but the claimant must be allowed to retain an
attorney if he so desires.
(c) The decision-maker need not file a full opinion or
make formal findings of fact or conclusions of law, but
should state in writing the reasons for his determination
and indicate the evidence he relied on.
(d) The decision-maker must be impartial, and he shall
not have participated in the investigatory or fact-finding
stages of the case or in making the determination under
review.
4B
In Pregent the Department advanced three interrelated argu-
ments which sought to prohibit the extention of the Goldberg
hearing requirements into the area of unemployment compensa-
tion. The Department claimed its present procedures adequately
44. Id. at 264.
45. Id. at 263.
46. Id. at 265-66.
47. Id.
48. As enumerated by the Pregent court, 361 F. Supp. at 794.
protected a claimant against arbitrary and unwarranted action.49
These procedures revealed periodic interviews with the claimant.
However, the claimant was not notified that he could have his
attorney present at these interviews, or that his benefits were in
jeopardy. The court, after noting that constitutionally required
procedural due process permits a quality of hearing proportional to
the person's stake in the outcome, 50 concluded that the Depart-
ment's procedures "did not rise to the level of a prior fair hear-
ing" and dismissed the claim that the procedures were adequate.51
The Department also contended that the Goldberg rationale
entitling welfare recipients to pretermination hearings cannot be
used to support pretermination hearings for unemployment com-
pensation recipients.52 Since unemployment compensation was es-
tablished for the purpose of providing a substitute for wages while
an unemployed worker is between jobs, 3 it bears many similari-
ties to both welfare benefits and wages. One factor that these three
forms of income share is that they all are used to fulfill the recipi-
ent's needs for the basic necessities of lf. Sinc ,te Supr.me
Court has found that the recipient of welfare benefits is entitled
to a pretermination hearing,54 and that the recipient of wages is en-
titled to a pregarnishment hearing55 one would logically conclude
that a recipient of unemployment benefits is entitled to a pretermi-
nation hearing. The Pregent court found that "need," as character-
ized in the Goldberg case, is "qualitatively" similar to the need upon
which a grant of unemployment compensation is based, even though
this grant of benefits is not based on any means test.5 6
Finally, the defendant Department argued that "the public
purse would be unduly jeopardized" if pretermination interviews
were required.57 The court weighing this governmental interest
against the claimant's constitutional right to a hearing found in
favor of the claimant. Closely following Goldberg, that court de-
clared that the additional expense of a procedure designed to pro-
tect such right "does not justify denying a [prior] hearing meeting
the ordinary standards of due process. '"58 The court noted that
there are two methods by which the Department can minimize
49. 361 F. Supp. at 788.
50. Van Alstyne, The Demise of the Right-Privilege Distinction in
Constitutional Law, 81 HARv. L. REv. 1439, 1452 (1968).
51. 361 F. Supp. at 790.
52. Id. at 788.
53. Id. at 791.
54. 397 U.S. at 266-71.
55. Sniadach v. Family Finance Corp., 395 U.S. 337 (1969).
56. 361 F. Supp. at 791. A means test pits the applicant's income
and assets against a minimum living standard which varies from state to
state. If the applicant's income is lower, he/she becomes eligible for the
benefits.
57. Id. at 788.
58. Kelly v. Wyman, 294 F. Supp. 893, 901 (S.D.N.Y. 1968), cited in
Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. at 261.
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the additional cost of pretermination hearings. First, to avoid the
expense of payment of benefits to an ineligible claimant while a
decision is pending, the Department can provide for recovery of
those benefits paid to an ineligible claimant. 59 Second, the De-
partment can apply its administrative expertise to implement pro-
cedures for prompt hearings.60
After disposing of these three arguments, the Pregent court
then proceeded to analyze the issue in Java of when benefits are
"due." The Pregent court reasoned that despite the fact that the
eligibility of the claimant may be reviewed weekly by the Depart-
ment, "the concept of when benefits are 'due' . . . does not change
from week to week." 6' 1 In short, the Pregent court has held that
once a claimant has been found initially eligible, he is entitled to
benefits until the termination of those benefits has been adjudi-
cated in a Goldberg type due process hearing.
6 2
In addition to New Hampshire, other jurisdictions have used
the Goldberg rationale to require due process hearings before the
administrative bureau can terminate or withhold unemployment
benefits. California and Vermont unemployment compensation au-
thorities were ordered not to terminate benefits prior to a Gold-
berg-type hearing in Crow v. California Department of Human
Resources63 and Wheeler v. Vermont.64 A third jurisdiction55
founded the claimant's right to a pretermination hearing under the
Social Security Act66 rather than on constitutional grounds. In
Hiatt v. Indiana Employment Security Division 7 the court found
that "the concept of when benefits are 'due' . . . does not change
from week to week after a claimant has been found eligible and no
prior, due process hearing has been held with regard to a subsequent
finding of ineligibility."68 Thus, concluded the court, the purpose
of the Social Security Act, to provide for early substitute compen-
59. 361 F. Supp. at 793.
60. Id.
61. 361 F. Supp. at 793.
62. Id. at 793-94.
63. 325 F. Supp. 1314 (N.D. Cal. 1970), cert. denied, 408 U.S. 924
(1972). This case was decided after Java was decided at the district court
level, but before the Supreme Court issued its opinion.
64. 335 F. Supp. 856 (D. Vt. 1971).
65. Hiatt v. Ind. Employment Security Div., 347 F. Supp. 218 (D. Ind.
1971), remanded sub. nom. Indiana Employment Security Division v.
Burney, 409 U.S. 540, rehearing denied, 410 U.S. 970 (1973) (remanded
to determine mootness of claim). See note 36 supra.
66. 42 U.S.C. § 503(a) (1) (1969). See note 6 supra.
67. See note 65 supra.
68. Id. at 223.
sation, would be frustrated if the claimant was not entitled to bene-
fits until a pretermination hearing was provided.69
Pennsylvania is also a jurisdiction which recognizes that an
evidentiary, due process hearing is constitutionally required. In
Daniels v. Unemployment Compensation Board of Review, 70 the
claimant was charged with a $208 overpayment which the Bureau
sought to recover by withholding three benefit checks which were
due the claimant.7 1 The court saw no need to distinguish the ter-
mination of benefits from the withholding of benefits and relied
on Java, Goldberg, and Wheeler to conclude a prior hearing was
constitutionally required.
72
Thus, all the jurisdictions which have dealt with the necessity
of pretermination hearings require a Goldberg hearing with the
exception of New York. 73  However, situations will arise where a
claimant's ineligibility is summarily determinable. In such instan-
ces, requiring a hearing would unnecessarily extend an ineligible
claimant's benefit period thereby creating a'needless drain on the
unemployment compensation fund. For example, if a claimant
appears on his scheduled reporting date with a physician's report
certifying him unable to work at any full time job, the claimant
is by definition ineligible for unemployment compensation. 74 The
question then arises as to whether the claimant is entitled to his
benefit check for the past two weeks despite the fact that he is
clearly ineligible at the moment. If the claimant alleges he was
eligible for the weeks in question, then an application of the fed-
eral law discussed above requires the payment of the benefits un-
til a pretermination hearing is held. If the claimant does not al-
lege his eligibility in the face of conclusive evidence of his inability
to work, there is no issue for a pretermination hearing to resolve
and the administrative bureau should be able to terminate the bene-
fits immediately. The federal case law reviewed herein does not rec-
ognize this possibility. This is a costly oversight since only those
over-payments made on a claimant's purposeful misrepresentations
can be recovered by the bureau.75 Any payments determined to be
undeserved in the pretermination hearing are generally not recov-
erable if already paid to the claimant. 76
In conclusion, a reasonable interpretation of federal case law
would appear to require de novo Goldberg hearings prior to the
termination of unemployment compensation benefits in order to
69. Id.
70. 10 Pa. Commonwealth Ct. 241, 309 A.2d 738 (1973).
71. Id. at 243, 309 A.2d at 740.
72. Id. at 245, 309 A.2d at 741.
73. Even New York requires a fact finding interview where the claim-
ant has an opportunity to be heard. See notes 37-38.
74. See, e.g., 43 PA. STAT. ANN. § 801 (d) (Supp. 1973).




protect the claimant's due process rights. However, where the
claimant cannot in good faith certify to his eligibility or dispute a
factual issue upon which his eligibility turns, a pretermination hear-
ing should not be required.
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